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Abstract 
Approaches to addressing privacy issues tend to assume privacy is well understood and typically 
approach the problem from a security perspective.  However, security is more concerned with safety 
than with privacy. Given the lack of satisfaction with advanced privacy-enhancing-technologies, we 
argue that an ontological framework is fundamental to advancing the capabilities of technology-
enabled solutions. In recognition that privacy is a right to control information about oneself, this 
paper develops a new ontological foundation for privacy - an initial and important step to modeling 
privacy as a means to improving the privacy protection effectiveness of information systems. 
Keywords: Privacy, Information Privacy, Right to Information Privacy, Ontological Status. 
1402
1 INTRODUCTION 
Privacy is an important characteristic of information sharing in human societies. Inevitably we give 
information away about ourselves, knowingly and willingly, because we want and/or need to 
communicate, share and exchange information with others; unknowingly or unwillingly, because of 
obligations, regulations enforcement, survival (such as buying goods and employment) or social needs. 
When information is processed in digital form by information systems - maintaining data privacy 
becomes a major concern. In particular, in the case of online information, technology-based 
approaches dominate the privacy literature in the area of information technology that tend to focus on 
information access control aspects like security. Recent emerging online social networking services 
typically emphasize the importance of technological issues due to the complexity of the networks’ 
Internet infrastructure. However, the increasing number of privacy breaches reported in the media 
reveals that the fundamental problem of data privacy protection still remains unsolved despite the 
plethora of privacy-enhancing-technologies (PETs) available for implementation.  
Approaches to addressing privacy issues tend to assume privacy is well understood and attack the 
problem from a security perspective rather than addressing the underlying ontological problem 
associated with privacy. There have been many definitions and analyses of “privacy” as a concept; 
however, clarity and consensus are still lacking. A widely cited definition of privacy is “the right to be 
left alone” (Warren and Brandeis 1890) – privacy in some societies and cultures can be understood as 
a human right. It is “the state or condition of being free from being observed or disturbed by other 
people” (OAD 2005). In the contemporary digital information era, privacy is naturally reduced to 
information privacy – “you are your information” – the “states” and the “conditions” of your “rights” 
are understood and disseminated in the form of information. Accordingly, privacy issues concern the 
justifications of “states” and “conditions” with respect to individuals’ “rights”. Such justifications 
have foundations in Information Ethics (IE) and Philosophy of Information (PI) – both address 
fundamental ontological problems. The lack of understanding the concept “privacy” and the state-of-
the-art of technological solutions suggest that, a deeper appreciation of privacy’s ontological status 
will help to develop a clear and robust set of requirements upon which advanced privacy-friendly 
information systems can be designed, developed and deployed.  
 
Figure 1. A Methodological Framework for Privacy Protection 
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Figure 1 illustrates the importance of a firm ontological foundation of privacy is for the development 
of privacy-friendly information systems. The purpose of this paper is to develop a new ontological 
grounding of privacy that will lead to a major improvement in information systems’ performance and 
have positive impacts on the quality of service that information systems can achieve in the 
contemporary era of social computing.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the pervasiveness and public nature 
of privacy using example scenarios; Section 3 studies some legal and social dimensions of privacy; 
Section 4 analyses fundamental ontological privacy problems based on the set of ontological 
dimensions identified; and Section 5 concludes the study with an outlook. 
2 UBIQUITOUSNESS  
It is impossible to live in today’s society without giving away information about ourselves. We buy 
food from a supermarket. The storeowner or cashier knows what we are buying. We register relevant 
information with agencies for purchasing basic infrastructure like power and water, buying goods, 
searching for jobs, planning/arranging travel, etc. The agencies know our contact details, habits, 
preferences, plans or intentions. We consult with doctors for healthcare. The doctor knows our health 
conditions. To illustrate some of privacy issues that arise in everyday life, consider the following 
examples where we describe two typical scenarios with one related to everyday life in the off-line 
world, and the other demonstrating how the online world is connected with the off-line world. 
[Example 1: Eating habit] I always buy the same type of fish from the same fish market. On New 
Year’s eve I visited the market again but I planned to buy a different type of fish for my family. When 
I entered the market the owner told me that all the fish I would normally buy sold out but she kept one 
for me because she knew I liked that kind of fish. It was the first time I felt uncomfortable about her 
knowing my eating habits because I did not want to take the fish that my mum did not like; however, I 
felt impolite by not accepting the owner’s kindness. At that time I preferred she did not know about 
my eating habits.   
[Example 2: Online vs. Off-line] I have several email accounts to keep personal emails and work-
related emails separately, because I wanted to keep my personal life and professional life strictly 
disjoint for privacy concerns. But I failed to do so after my housemate Katy moved overseas because 
she likes to send messages to a group of people in one email with email addresses explicitly listed in 
the CC line. One day I received an email from Tom replying to Katy’s travel message. I did not know 
that the sender, Katy’s friend Tom, is my colleague Tom and I hit return to send my opinions 
regarding Katy’s discussion topic. Next an email from Tom reached me asking how I see the new 
changes to the holiday policies in my company. 
3 GROUNDING PRIVACY 
A crucial and thus far unanswered question is how privacy should be understood such that clear and 
detailed guidelines for guarding privacy or developing a privacy-friendly information system can be 
established. The importance and the role of privacy must first be understood: what is privacy and to 
what extent is it of value to us? Philosophers justify an object’s value as a compound property of 
intrinsic value and extrinsic value. Intrinsic value concerns the value an object has in itself or for its 
own sake, whereas extrinsic value concerns the value that can be generated from intrinsic values. 
Intrinsic value is absolute but can be contextual, while extrinsic value can be subjective and 
contextual. 
The philosophical value of an object provides a philosophical foundation upon which the importance 
of privacy can be justified by its value. By its connotation of “rights”, privacy has intrinsic value 
because of its associated “rights” which are fundamental to human dignity (e.g., life, happiness, 
freedom, knowledge, ability, resource, security, respect, etc.) In human society, individuals develop 
relationships with dignity and mutual respect. Consequently, privacy has extrinsic value, i.e., the 
power of rights, which protects us from losing dignity. Without privacy we will not have the 
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necessary dignity that enables us to build relationships with others in society - as Rachels (1985) 
states, privacy enables us to form relationships with other people.  
3.1 The Nature of Privacy 
The intrinsic value of privacy suggests a way to understand the nature of privacy and its scope by 
using the situations in which dignity is required as criteria:  
• Natural dignity in a naturally private situation. For example, nobody knows what I look like 
when I am sleeping.  
• Normative dignity in a normatively private situation protected by ethical, legal or 
conventional norms. For example, nobody knows my consultation (the content and the 
activity) with my doctor. 
Accordingly, privacy with natural dignity and normative dignity are referred to as natural privacy 
(Moor 1997) and normative privacy (Moor 1997), respectively. In the natural dignity example, natural 
privacy concerns the right not to be disturbed and the right not to be observed (if one does not want to 
be), e.g., when “I” am sleeping; whereas in the case of normative dignity, normative privacy concerns 
the right to keep the consultation content and information about the consultation activity private. 
However, these two categories provide insufficient support in understanding the nature of privacy 
because they do not detail situations in which dignity is determined and obtained. Moor (1997) gave a 
better interpretation by emphasizing situations as follows:  
“An individual or group has normative privacy in a situation with regard to others if and only 
if in that situation the individual or group is normatively protected from intrusion, 
interference, and information access by others.” 
It can be seen that the key to determining privacy status is the situation, which essentially involves 
others (in relation to the privacy protection subject) and further requires justification of intrusion, 
interference and the nature and kind of information access. This justification is necessary to 
understand “what is not a private situation”, which is a mechanism to reach an understanding of “what 
is a private situation where privacy can be protected”.  
From a normative perspective, the perception of intrusion, interference and relevance of information 
access can significantly vary, culturally and spatiotemporally; hence, the difficulty to specify privacy 
ontologically. Moor (1997) proposed a Core Value Framework (CVF) to uncover common existences 
in all human cultures as a means to justify the importance of privacy. Values of these existences must 
be fundamental to human evaluation such that they can be shared by all humans regardless of their 
cultural contexts. Such values represent human needs, and are thus core to dignity. In the CVF privacy 
is seen as an extrinsic value to support all the core values for human society. By this interpretation, 
privacy intrinsically supports human society because it is an expression of a core value namely 
security.  In this light, Moor (1997) views all the core values are mutually supporting. We agree with 
this philosophical stance and furthermore we argue that privacy is not only an expression of security, 
but also it intrinsically supports all other core values with its own intrinsic value via rights. 
Subsequently privacy is a core value of humans in society. It follows, to a certain extent, that a 
personal privacy claim is a publicity claim, which necessarily reveals identification of who is making 
the claim because such a claim requires recognition from others. In other words, one’s perception 
about one’s relationship to others involved in a given situation in which the claim is valid needs to be 
presented.  
A successful identification performed in one context might not be successfully performed in another 
context. This is because identities are valid only in certain contexts. A situation claimed for 
occurrences such as intrusion, interference and information access that related to one’s privacy status 
is valid only when one can be identified in the context where the situation occurs. This follows a 
situation to be claimed for relevant occurrences essentially a claim of identity in context and 
associated accessibility (and inaccessibility), which involves a view of one’s relationships to others. 
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Following this line of reasoning, privacy is a form of claim to rights, self-situations and self-identity 
(typically via relationships), in one’s desired status.  
With this interpretation, our aim for privacy protection does not align with the common understanding 
that information privacy is the minimum amount of personal data to be shared – i.e., “data 
minimisation” as requirements (Leenes et al. 2008). Our approach demands that privacy protection 
protects one’s rights in claiming the desired status of information about oneself, while not violating 
others’ rights. 
3.2 Dimensions of Privacy Claim 
To develop a justification of one’s privacy status, this sub-section explores dimensions of concepts 
relevant to privacy claims, namely, rights, relationships, identities, situations and goals.  
3.2.1 Rights 
The right to information privacy is the right to control “who can do what to me”. 
• The who concerns one’s relationship to others. This concern requires a consideration of 
situations in which the relationship is valid/recognized. Since relationships evolve over time, 
a situation is determined spatiotemporally – i.e., when and where, if applicable. Thus, the 
right to information privacy has a situation dimension – i.e., in what situation can the right be 
claimed. 
• The what concerns information content and details its information about “me”. The right in 
this dimension is to determine size, volume and granularity of the “what”.   
• The do concerns actions on the “what” (i.e., the selected information). Do-actions can be 
observation, presentation, access, manipulation or distribution. Observation means watching 
and remarking on the information, presentation refers to the freedom of one in presenting the 
information (i.e., when, where and how to present the information), access means ways of 
viewing and retrieving the information, manipulation refers to modification of the 
information, and distribution means sharing the information out with one or among a number 
of recipients.  
The following three rights are required for information privacy (Williams 2009; Chen and Williams 
2010a):  
• choice – the right to decide if the information is private or public, what information to control, 
and what action(s) can be performed on the selected information. 
• consent – the right to declare (self-)choice to others (what and how to control). 
• control – the right to enact the consent. 
In summary, the right to information privacy is the right to choose who has permission to do what to 
enable control of one’s information on one’s desired status. All rights can be claimed in any of the 
three dimensions: who, what and do-action.  
3.2.2 Relationships 
A relationship indicates a connection between at least two entities, directly or indirectly. Such a 
connection can be symmetric or asymmetric. A relationship is symmetric if entities involved in the 
relationship share the same attitude of the relationship, i.e., recognize the relationship under the same 
conditions; otherwise, the relationship is asymmetric. For example, the relationship between A and B 
is symmetric if both set the relationship to the same type under the same conditions. The relationship 
is asymmetric if A sees B as a friend but B sees A as a colleague. The asymmetric property implies the 
existence of direction in a relationship. The condition that holds in a relationship is referred to as the 
type of the relationship. 
The same social entities can hold more than one type of relationship. For example, A and B are 
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siblings, classmates and both are members of The A&B Club. The connection between A and B is 
therefore described as “sibling, classmate and The A&B Club member”. As a result a direct 
connection between two entities is multiplex if more than one relationship exists between them.  
A connection can directly or indirectly connect entities. When two entities are connected indirectly, 
the connection can be described by the distance between them, and the relationship between all the 
entities connecting them (i.e., the two entities under consideration). The concept of connection degree 
(Chen and Williams 2009) can be used to indicate the distance. For example, if A connects to B, and B 
connects to C, then A is said to be 2 degrees away from C, i.e., the connection degree between A and 
C is 2. If there are multiple paths connecting A to B, technically the degree of A and B is the length of 
the shortest path between A and B, because it reflects one’s ability to connect to another economically. 
However, when considering privacy, the length of a connection path is not a dominating factor in 
assessing a relatioinship; rather, the types of relationships involved in the path have more impact on 
one’s privacy status. The concept of relationship by connectivity (RBC) (Chen and Williams 2010b) 
can be used to describe this complexity of relationships. It describes a set of relationship types 
between two entities under consideration and the related connection degree from one of the two 
entities as a reference. In the above example, if A and B are colleagues, B and C are friends, and A and 
C do not know each other, then the RBC from A to C is described as a path: {(“work”,1),(“friend”,2)}. 
Social entities involved in a relationship can be at different levels of abstraction. For example, a 
relationship can be individual to individual, individual to group where the individual can belong to the 
group, group to group where one group can belong to another group or they can overlap or be 
completely disjoint. Thus, a relationship has an abstraction level, explicitly or implicitly.  
In summary, a claim of relationship needs to include status of direction, type, multiplex, connection 
degree and connectivity (i.e., RBC).  
3.2.3 Identities 
According to the Oxford dictionary (OAD 2005), identity is “the fact of being who or what a person 
or thing is”, or “a close similarity or affinity”. Commonly it is understood as something a person or 
thing has that distinguishes themself from others. 
Physical properties form natural identities for all beings. Humans are beings that have social 
requirements - in fact, social ability and physical needs. In human society, identities are often seen as 
social identities. In Appiah’s (in Taylor 1994) view, a social identity has collective and personal 
dimensions. In a society, an individual often belongs to various social categories (e.g., categories of 
qualification, profession, leisure, race, gender, religion, etc.) where the individual is judged by others 
to fit in. This judgement reflects others’ view in recognizing the individual’s collective position; 
therefore, it can be seen as an identity of the individual in the collective context under consideration, 
i.e., collective identity. The collective dimension of one’s social identity holds the intersection of 
one’s collective identities. Analogically, the personal dimension holds the intersection of all social 
properties that do not comprise a social category (e.g., intelligence, attractiveness, objection, etc.) 
Both dimensions intersect a complete social identity. By emphasizing the “social importance” of 
properties as a criterion for social identities, Appiah sees a property as part of one’s identity 
essentially relies on others’ response to the property. This view largely reflects the fact that identities 
are generally valid only in certain contexts – i.e., an identity valid in one context might not be valid in 
another context. This fact is evidenced in many everyday’s scenarios. For example, a student ID of 
University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) is valid at UTS but not valid at other universities, a driver 
license is valid in the state of NSW but not in the state of VIC, an UTS fitness membership is valid at 
the UTS Fitness Center but not at the Broadway Fitness Center, just to name a few.  
Another relevant view is the concept of partial identity (Pfitzmann and Hensen 2007), which is a 
subset of a complete identity. In a certain context, a partial identity can serve as a full-fledged identity 
of an entity, and can be a collective identity if it is valid in a collective context. In reality, this is not 
necessary always the case because a partial identity can contain more or less information than a 
collective identity requires. Thus, partial identities can be recognized in wider or narrower contexts 
than a collective context of a complete category. On the other hand, unlike collective identities that 
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are recognized collectively, partial identities mainly rely on the entity whose identity is under 
consideration about how he/she wants to be identified by others in order to connect to them on a 
desired relationship. In other words, partial identities reflect how the data subject intends or is allowed 
to interact with others within the context in which the partial identity is valid – as studied by Goffman 
(1959), partial identities are revealed by the individual with concerns of what part of self-identity is 
prepared to show to the world (i.e., an intended context) and therefore it is essential to keep contexts 
separated for partial identities. Rachels (1985) states such separation of contexts allows different types 
of relationships.  
On the other hand, because partial identity is subdivided from a complete identity with intended 
purpose (i.e., to be used in an intended context for maintaining certain types of social relationships for 
social interactions), they can blur the boundary between social dimension and personal dimension. 
The concept of situation described in the next sub-section can be used to reclaim the boundary for 
privacy justification.  
3.2.4 Situations 
Situations show how relationships and relevant privacy occurrences are situated in context, and thus 
determine their status. We define the term “situation” as an instance of a sub-context. In other words, 
multiple situations can co-exist in a context. In an intended context where one’s identity is created, 
occurrences are relevant to privacy when any of the identity information is used unexpectedly. Such 
occurrences include positive do-actions like welcome services and negative do-actions like intrusion, 
interference or invasion. What conditions can trigger these events? When an event is triggered, what 
is the subsequence of actions that will follow? A situation is determined by the status of all properties 
that can answer these questions. Thus, a situation has an occurrence dimension. 
An occurrence affects the environment only when an actor activates it under certain conditions. It 
remains active in those circumstances. An occurrence may or may not have co-occurrence that may or 
may not affect the environment. A privacy occurrence is an occurrence that affects one’s privacy 
status. The actor of such an occurrence can be the person whose privacy is under consideration, or not. 
The impact of an occurrence can be positive or negative. For the purpose of privacy’s ontological 
status, we only consider occurrences that will generate negative impacts on one’s privacy. Since 
privacy is a claim of one’s desired status about one’s information, a privacy occurrence is a claim of 
one’s believes of its impact on one’s privacy status. Thus, a claim of a privacy occurrence claims the 
type of the occurrence that distinguishes from other occurrences, actors who triggered the occurrence, 
conditions under which the occurrence is active, reasons about the claim, co-occurrences as 
subsequence of the occurrence (if any), and implications that one believes that will occur. Since the 
claim of actors is a claim of one’s relationship with them, i.e., actors are claimed via the span of 
relationships, a situation has a relationship dimension.  
3.2.5 Goals 
Goals indicate desired results. Goals of privacy reflect one’s desired privacy status. While privacy is 
subjective and highly person-dependent, there are common goals for human beings’ privacy as a value 
to support core values intrinsically and extrinsically. In other words, there are common desired results 
for privacy for all human beings.  Consider core values namely dignity, security, ability and resource, 
common goals expected to support these core values typically include: 
• Awareness – one is aware of one’s rights and situations. 
• Anonymity – one’s ability to undertake an activity without being identified. 
• Pseudonym – one’s ability to undertake an activity without being “physically” identified by 
one’s actual identity. 
• Self-Partition – one’s ability to partition one’s identity for different contexts. 
• Integrity – one’s ability to prevent information from being misused without one’s permission. 
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• Unobservability  - one’s ability to be free from being observed. 
• Unpresentability – one’s ability to prevent one’s information from undesired presentation. 
• Inaccessibility – one’s ability to prevent one’s information from unwelcome access. 
• Inmanipulatability – one’s ability to prevent one’s information from unwelcome modification. 
• Indistributability – one’s ability to prevent one’s information from those who has access 
privilege distributing the information to third parties.  
• Unreachability – one’s ability to prevent one’s information from being reachable upon an 
absence of one’s consent or biased preferences.  
• Unlinkability – one’s ability to prevent one’s information in different context from being 
linked together. 
• Confidentiality – one’s information is kept confidential during transfer from one 
location/party to another. 
• Liability – one’s obligation as a fundamental requirement to realise all the goals above. 
• Accountability – one’s ability to justify all the goals above on one’s core values. 
These goals support all the core values from different aspects. Goals can be claimed separately, jointly, 
or a combination of both. A claim of one goal might lead to a claim of other goals, implicitly or 
explicitly. Detailed analysis of the interplays between goals will be presented in the next section.  
4 ONTOLOGICAL STATUS  
Figure 2, below, shows the relationships between dimensions that ontologically describe the intrinsic 
and extrinsic properties of privacy. In the following we describe these dimensions and their 
interaction in detail.  
 
Figure 2. Ontological Grounding of Privacy 
Rights 
One’s right to information privacy is the right to control what others can do with information about 
oneself. The do actions are common actions that can be performed on information where privacy 
might be infringed, i.e., actions can impact information’s known and used status. One’s ability to 
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control one’s information is to determine who can perform what action. Allowing distribution 
automatically grants permissions for access, presentation and observation, and can also lead to a 
permission for manipulation. A permission to access grants permissions for presentation and 
observation.  
Permissions not only can be transferred between actions, but also actors – i.e., the who object. Since 
this object reflects the one’s relationship to others, the transferability of permission is determined by 
the relationship. 
Identities and Relationships  
An identity is valid when the information it carries is sufficient to identify an entity in the intended 
context.  The validity of a collective identity relies on the validity of the social category where the 
identity exists. If a collective identity is made available outside the social category, a claim of the 
identity will reveal the individual’s relationship to the social category, and therefore relationships to 
those in the same social category. A partial identity may or may not be valid in the context where it is 
intended because partial identities may be made available by the individual whose identity is under 
consideration. They may be subjective due to the unawareness of the intended context. For example, 
intended relationship types, networks, situations and their implications, etc.  
With the purpose that relationships between the individual (whose partial identities are under 
consideration) and others’ can be established and maintained, partial identities are created by making 
a subset of an identity available in a context where some others have access. Such a purpose provides 
a way to discover identity via relationship (either existing ones or potential relationships).  A claim of 
identity implicitly makes a claim of relationship. 
Relationships can be infinite like kinship. Most relationships have a lifetime with start date and end 
date, and other conditions bound to it. Conditions can include obligations that entities of the 
relationship must carry on in order to be tied to the relation. Obligations on an asymmetric 
relationship can be different for the entities on the relationship. In other words, obligations can be 
asymmetric for an asymmetric relationship. When entities are involved in other relationships, the 
obligation may be inherited by other entities that connect to them. Asymmetric obligations can lead to 
permissions transferred to those connecting to them. Situations that involve such occurrences can 
easily lead to situations where information flow along unexpected or unintended pathways and 
resulting in an increase in uncertainties of obligations and permissions.  
Social referrals are common activities in human society. They naturally introduce indirect social 
connections. When one entity connects to another via a referral, a new connection is established 
indirectly. Such a connection can be implicit if the entity being referred was not aware of the referral. 
Such implicitness creates an accountability privacy problem (i.e., the goal of accountability). When 
the indirect connection is developed to a direct connection and the referred entity remains unaware of 
the previous situation (i.e., one is not aware of one’s information being made known to the other 
party), negative privacy occurrences or unexpected do-actions may occur.   
Situations 
A situation describes a state of affairs. It has a time and a location attribute. Thus, a situation shows 
static relationships. Each relationship is identified by a type, a direction and a connection degree. A 
relationship situation reflects the connected entities’ views on the relationship. For example, A and B 
are “friends” and both agree to keep each other’s personal information confidential. They both work 
for the same company where A is in the marketing department led by B. One day client C called A on 
her mobile for a potential contract. A was surprised that C knew her personal mobile number. A then 
received a call from B who said that he gave C her number because that would be a potential big 
contract for the company. A was upset that B saw her as a colleague more than a friend. At the time A 
received the calls from both B and C, B exposed his attitude towards his relationship with A as 
“colleague” not “friend”.  From this example we can see that a claim on actors via relationship is a 
claim of the actor’s view. 
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From a static perspective, an occurrence situation shows the pre-condition or the post-condition of an 
event or action at a particular time. For example, a lost occurrence indicates one lost some privacy as 
a result of some information being made known to unintended parties or given to wrong hands. It is a 
result of “make known” or “use” actions. Although, it can also be a pre-condition for subsequent 
events or actions. For example, loss of privacy can lead to privacy-invading actions.  
Most occurrences related to one’s privacy have actors other than oneself. Such actors are typically 
explicitly or implicitly, connected to the individual whose privacy is under consideration. When there 
is more than one actor of a negative occurrence, the occurrence situation can explain a potential 
privacy-invading network.  
Situations can be isolated or overlapping. A situation is isolated by unique status uniquely described 
by all its properties, i.e. an isolated situation is disjoint from any other situations. Situations overlap 
when they are not disjoint. The interplay between situations complicates the justification of one’s 
privacy status and can result in failures of claiming privacy rights. The complexity of situations lies in: 
• A situation instantiated by a partial context of a complete intended context may not recognize 
one’s identity. Claiming occurrences in such a situation is difficult to justify. 
• A claim can across multiple situations with current or past time-stamps. A situation can be an 
abstraction of other situations. If a claim is associated with an abstract situation, justification 
must be based on all situations (and related) that support the abstract aspect of the situation 
being claimed.  
• Situations can be used to infer other (possible) situations. For example, in a situation where 
information is lost, intrusion, interference or disturbance occurrence(s) can result in an 
invading situation. A claim for maximum rights (privacy) needs be intelligible to include 
“future situations” in accordance with potential inferences.  
Situations related to oneself include not only the above complex scenarios, but also necessary 
situations for those who are in one’s potential privacy-invading networks. A successful claim of one’s 
privacy right needs to be made on all possible situations. However, in a complex social environment – 
i.e., large, open, dynamic and complex social networks, it is impossible to learn all the possible 
situations. One needs to justify one’s position in the network based on some criteria. Thus, a theory is 
required.   
Goals 
One’s awareness of one’s privacy status is a fundamental goal, without which one will not be able to 
adapt other goals in a dynamic environment. Anonymity, pseudonym and self-partition ensure 
integrity of identities: i) both anonymity and pseudonymity achieve confidentiality of an identity and 
reserve completeness of the identity, and ii) self-partition reduces the chances of misusing one’s 
identity by subdividing it based on context.  
A pseudonym creates an anonymity version of collective identity. Self-partition generates partial 
identities by contexts. Such a partial identity may or may not be a collective identity – detailed 
discussion of these two types of identities was presented in the previous sub-section. 
Pseudonyms can introduce overheads if one creates different types of pseudonyms for different 
contexts, where there are overlaps; particularly, when accessibility or distributability is granted for 
those who can reach, observe or access other contexts that are disjoint with the pseudonyms’ contexts. 
The same is true in partial identity overlaps. In these cases, pseudonym/self-partition affects 
achievability of other goals, and in turn rights of the individual whose identity is under consideration 
may not be successfully claimed. 
Reachability does not guarantee accessibility. It reflects only probabilities of being reached from 
where and/or by whom.  Therefore inaccessibility does not imply unreachability. One must be able to 
reach another in order to observe him/her. Thus, observability requires reachability; and 
unreachability warrants unobservability where unreachbility includes unlinkability. For example, A 
talked to B about C when A did not know C personally (i.e., A does not have accessibility to C). 
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However, A was able to observe C. Through the communication with B, A enabled B’s observability 
on C.  If later on C granted A accessibility to his information and A talked to B again about C, B was 
not able to grant accessibility on C from the second communication between herself and A. In other 
words, observability can be transferred but accessibility cannot be transferred without permission 
because accessibility includes observability; a transfer of accessibility permits transfer of 
observability. Moreover, observability comes with reachability; a transfer of observability includes a 
transfer of reachability. Thus, unreachability includes unobservability, which implies inaccessibility.  
Distributability enables accessibility, and follows observability and reachability. One’s goal to prevent 
others from distributing one’s information must include not granting accessibility to those under one’s 
consideration. Distributability can also come from observability because one can distribute what one 
observes even though one has no access to the information. In the above example, B does not have 
accessibility to C, however, she can distribute what she has observed about C to others. Thus, one 
needs to assure inaccessibility and unobservability to realise indistributability.  
Without achieving confidentiality one will not be able to obtain desired status of one’s information. 
One may be able to achieve unreachability, unobservability, inaccessibility and/or indistributability; 
however, if one fails to keep the information desirable attributes that where reachability, observability, 
accessibility and/or distributability are enabled, information leaks will be possible. For example, if C 
granted A a distribution permission to distribute his information to B and A passed the information to 
B without noting D was within the distance of hearing, then D would receive the information about 
C – i.e., C’s information was leaking – an undesired result that against C’s goals of achieving 
unobservability on D. 
Many types of information can be partitioned into parts. Some parts may have the same impact on 
one’s information privacy status whereas some may not affect the status or have different types and/or 
degrees of impacts. Use of the complete information and use of portions of the information can result 
in different privacy statuses of one’s information. On the other hand, from a contextual perspective, 
integrity ensures information is used in the permitted context(s). Information permitted to be used in a 
sub-context of an intended context, or in an unintended context, can result in undesired status of the 
information. Thus, the integrity of information is essential to achieve one’s privacy goals completely.  
5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Privacy concerns focus on “who can do what to me”. In human society, privacy is ubiquitous. Its 
pervasiveness and public nature highlight its legal and social foundation which has a philosophical 
root. Without developing an ontological foundation for privacy it will continue to be difficult to 
achieve practical advances in effective privacy protection technologies. Current privacy-enhancing-
technologies (PETs) lack support for modeling the necessary rich legal and social expectations. In fact 
they put a major emphasis on security rather than privacy. Security is more concerned with safety than 
with privacy. To bridge this research gap, we propose a methodological framework (Figure 1). This 
framework takes an conceptual approach to advancing the ontological foundations of privacy as a 
basis to support effective privacy requirements analysis, which in turn supports the development of 
innovative privacy-by-design (Cavoukian 2010) models. Privacy-by-design has been identified as an 
open issue in privacy-friendly information systems (Williams 2009; Chen and Williams 2010a; 
Cavoukian 2010). Privacy-by-design models can be used to develop technologies that can support 
user behaviours and assist users to learn and manage their privacy more effectively. 
As an initial step to implement this framework, we analysed fundamental ontological characteristics 
of privacy. We provided a new ontological understanding of privacy from its legal and social 
foundations namely rights and relationships. We then identified relevant concepts that are related to 
these two core concepts, namely, identity, situation and privacy goals. Future work will build on the 
new ontological foundation and focus on privacy-by-design models with intelligent capabilities to 
address the problem of developing robust privacy-friendly information systems and to provide the 
necessary support to users which will allow them to give informed consent, to control and manage the 
privacy of information content. 
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